turn' was very much an exacerbation of the nationalist tendencies in the PCR leadership.
There were good reasons for this: Romanian communism had been traditionally very weak and owed its seizure of power in 1947 to the presence of the Red Army. It was only by playing the national card -and delivering economic growth -that it was eventually able to form a 'contract' with the subjugated population. Radu Cinpoeș rightly points out the use of nationalism as a 'legitimizing tool': 'Gheorghiu-Dej's break from Moscow resulted in increased popularity and national support for the regime which banked on the propagandaenhanced anti-Russian sentiment felt by many Romanians' 10 . When it came to the 'cultural revolution' of the 1970s, contrasts with countries with significant communist traditions, for example Czechoslovakia, became glaring, as Katherine Verdery points out: 'Had communist and socialist ideas been more robust prior to the Party's accession to power, these might have had more weight in its consolidation of rule. In their absence, however, the exhortations that evoked answer and disagreement were those concerning the Nation' 11 .
There had to be total unity between party, leader and nation: 'The Party, Ceaușescu, 
